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Abstract
Innovative solutions need to be developed to
defend against the continued threat of computer
worms. We propose the spectral graph theory worm
detection model that utilizes traffic dispersion graphs,
the strong node concept, and phantom components
to create detection thresholds in the eigenspectrum
of the dual basis.
This detection method is
employed in our proposed model to quickly and
accurately detect worm attacks with different attack
characteristics. It also intrinsically identifies infected
nodes, potential victims, and estimates the worm scan
rate.
We test our model against the worm-free
NPS2013 dataset, a modeled Blaster worm, and the
WannaCry CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-284-1 and
CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-285-1 datasets.
Our
results show that the spectral graph theory worm
detection model has better performance rates compared
to other models reviewed in literature.

1.

Introduction

In the modern world, it has become increasingly
difficult to secure and defend cyber systems. In
2019, the number of malware attacks reached 7.2
billion, the number of ransomware attacks reached
151.9 million [1], the number of phishing attacks that
were successful in evading network security measures
increased by 25 percent [2], and a 29 percent increase
was observed in cryptocurrency attacks in the first
quarter [3]. Additionally, adware aggressively increased
to over 50 million detections across Windows and Mac
systems. Yet, the number of consumer threat detections
decreased by two percent [4].
Computer worms, specifically, present a significant
threat to cyber systems due to the propensity of the
attack to reach an alarming size in a very short
time period [5, 6]. In May of 2017, the WannaCry
ransomware cryptoworm infected over 200,000 hosts
across 150 countries. In September 2018, it was
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estimated that more than 12,000 variants of the
WannaCry worm were still being utilized [7]. Since
attackers continue to evolve computer worms to be faster
and more destructive, innovative solutions need to be
developed that will shift the status quo towards, or in
favor of, the network defender.
Several worm detection systems and methods have
been developed, ranging from traditional anomaly
detection methods, like local outlier factor (LOF) [8],
to behavioral analysis methods, like destination-source
correlation (DSC) [9]. However, the proposed systems
and methods in literature leave room for improvement
in detection rates, false alarm rates, and detection time.
Additionally, most fail to provide additional critical
information required for effective network response.
In this paper, we propose the novel spectral graph
theory worm detection model (SGTWDM) that utilizes a
traffic dispersion graph (TDG), the strong node concept
(SNC), and phantom components to detect worm
attacks. The SNC-based detection method employed
in our proposed SGTWDM proves to be extremely
accurate in detecting a worm attack once the second
infected node begins exhibiting worm attack behavior.
Additionally, the method intrinsically provides the
network defender with the specific nodes that have been
infected by the worm, other potential victims of the
attack, and an estimated scan rate for the worm. These
details provide the network defender with the required
information to respond to an attack.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 discusses related work on anomaly detection
with specific focus on worm attacks.
Section 3
proposes the SGTWDM and discusses the underlying
components of that allow for detection of worm
attacks. Section 4 shows the simulation results of the
proposed detection method against a worm-free dataset,
a modeled Blaster worm, and a WannaCry worm dataset.
Finally, Section 5 provides a summary of the paper with
discussion of future research.
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2.

Anomaly Detection Literature

In this section, we begin by providing an overview of
the common detection algorithms utilized for intrusion
detection. Then we discuss graph theory-based anomaly
detection techniques proposed in literature review. Next,
we examine other methods of worm attack detection in
literature. Finally, we review the performance metrics
of some of the worm detection methods proposed in
literature.

2.1.

Intrusion Detection

The detection of network security threats has been
widely studied in the field of intrusion detection.
Intrusion detection techniques can be categorized
into one of two methods: signature-based (sometimes
referred to as misuse-based) or anomaly-based.
Signature-based methods require known profiles (or
signatures) of the attack which are utilized as references
to detect future attacks. These methods are very
accurate, having a low false-alarm rate, but are not
effective against previously unknown attacks.
Anomaly-based methods on the other hand, utilize
statistical behavior modeling techniques to determine
normal from abnormal [10].
These methods are
typically prone to higher false-alarm rates, unless
the network follows strict/static behavioral patterns
[10, 11].
They also detect previously unknown
attacks. Anomaly-based methods can be divided into
three categories according to the methods utilized for
detection: statistical, knowledge (or data mining), and
machine learning [10]. A classification of the different
algorithms of each of these categories found in literature
is shown in Figure 1.

2.2.

Graph Theory-based Detection

Since our worm detection method utilizes graph
theory and spectral graph theory tools, we reviewed
literature for other graph theory-based anomaly
detection methods and discovered three proposed
methods [20, 22, 23]. The work in [22] uses TDGs
to model network traffic and to train the proposed
detection system. The system training produces graph
edit distance and dK-2 distance thresholds that are used
for detection. Flows that are detected as anomalous
are passed to the classification system, which utilizes
the VF2 graph matching algorithm, a graph-subgraph
isomorphism analysis algorithm, to compare the graph
of the anomalous flows to known graphical attack
patterns. While this method is successful, it assumes all
graphical attack patterns are known without explanation
of how those are acquired. Additionally, this system

Figure 1. Classification of anomaly based IDSs
according to their detection algorithm, after [10, 12].

requires increased computational overhead in detecting
and classifying a worm attack, since two separate
algorithms are performed.
The work in [20] uses the causal-tree worm
propagation behavior to detect worm attacks.
Specifically, the detection system uses various graph
metrics, like branching factor and depth, to identify
worm causal-tree behavior. While the method presented
in [20] is successful in identifying an attack, it fails to
inherently identify the specific nodes infected by the
attack.
Finally, the work in [23] uses spectral graph tools
to detect network congestion in a software-defined
network’s physical layer.
The detection methods
employs phantom nodes to create a threshold in
the eigenvector matrix, which is utilized to compare
node connectivity, or available link capacity, to the
connectivity of the phantom node. While the work
provides a method to detect network congestion, the
method can not distinguish normal network congestion
from congestion resulting from an attack.
Our proposed SGTWDM adapts and expands upon
these graph theory-based works. The result is a more
computationally efficient worm detection system that
inherently identifies the infected node(s), the potential
victim nodes, and an estimated attack scan rate, for the
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Source
[9]
[8]
[13]
[14]
[15, 16]
[17]
[18]

Table 1. Additional worm detection methods in literature.
Target
Detection Method
Scan-based, fast spreading, local worm
Two-phased DSC algorithm
Worms, DoS, probe
LOF association mining
Worms, probe, DoS, alpha flows
Multiway-subspace methods using feature entropy
Internet worm
Time of next infection
Camouflaging worms
Power spectral density distribution and spectral flatness measure
Worms, distributed denial of service, and botnets Collaborative intrusion prevention architecture (CIPA) with neural net
Worms, distributed denial of service, etc.
Connection attempt and host unreachable message count

Source
[19]
[9]
[13]
[14]
[20, 21]
[15, 16]
[17]

Table 2. Worm detection performance metrics in literature.
Detection Rate
False Alarm Rate
Detection Time
Before 1.5% of vulnerable nodes infected
N/A
N/A
When 0.0064 of vulnerable nodes infected N/A
N/A
0.8
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
100 min
N/A
0.015 (theoretical) 1.8 sec (theoretical)
0.993
N/A
1460 min
Witty: 0.96
Witty: 0.05
Slammer: 0.95
Slammer: 0.075
N/A
Conficker: 0.92
Conficker: 0.095

purpose of network defense.

2.3.

Other Worm Detection Methods

For comprehensive purposes, we reviewed other
methods of detection for worm attacks. Statistical
methods based on connection failures, probes of
unused address space, and in/out packet counts are
commonly utilized due to the underlying scanning
behavior of the worm. Berk et al. [24] proposed an
internet control message protocol (ICMP) destination
unreachable based detection algorithm, and the
distributed anti-worm (DAW) architecture [25] utilized
a detection algorithm that tracks transmission control
protocol TCP synchronize (SYN) and reset (RST)
packets for the detection of worm attacks. However,
both are limited by the type of worm it will detect,
require a large amount of resources, and are unable
to detect the worm until a significant infection has
already been achieved [26]. Wu et al. [19] proposed
a victim-based algorithm that classifies a source as a
victim if it sends packets to inactive addresses and then
sets a threshold on the number of victims in order to
generate an alert for the presence of a worm. While this
method requires less resources, it is still not very useful
for detecting other types of worms or network attacks.
Additional worm detection methods not mentioned in
this section can be found in Table 1.

2.4.

Worm Detection Metrics

With respect to performance metrics, very few worm
detection systems and methods in literature provide

analytical analysis on detection rate, false alarm rate,
and detection time. Table 2 provides the worm detection
metrics we observed in literature. For most methods,
the detection rates are above 0.9 and the false alarm
rates are below 0.1; however, very few methods provide
information on the time to detect the attack.

3.

Proposed Spectral Graph Theory
Worm Detection Model

In this section, we present the SGTWDM
shown in Figure 2. We first explore the critical
components utilized in the SNC-based detection
method. Specifically, we discuss TDGs as a means
of representing network traffic, phantom components
as a method to produce detection thresholds in the
eigenspectrum index of the eigenvalue matrix Λ and
eigenvector matrix V , and the SNC as a method to
characterize network traffic behavior. Then, we describe
the SNC-based detection process. Next, we discuss
parameters determined externally by the network
administrator. Finally, we present the attack parameters
identified through the detection process. We limit our
discussion in this section to scan-based TCP worms,
but the methods and model are also applicable for user
datagram protocol (UDP) worms.

3.1.

Traffic Dispersion Graph

Adopting the TDG method in [22] to mathematically
represent network traffic, the proposed SGTWDM
utilizes TDGs to mathematically and visually represent
end-to-end communications within the network. In a
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Q = D − A,

(3)

or [27]

Q(i, j) =



i,j
−w
P

n
j=1




wi,j

0

if ai,j ∈ L,
if i = j,
otherwise.

(4)

The Laplacian matrix contains all necessary information
to visually reconstruct the network data into graphical
format.
It is important to note, not all network traffic
flows are utilized by the model to form TDGs. To
conform with the worm attack behavior (see Section
3.2), the traffic flows are filtered to keep data on
SYN-only packets, the first packet the of the TCP 3-way
handshake, with unique destination addresses. As an
added benefit, the eigendecomposition computational
costs associated with the SNC-based detection method
are greatly reduced by this filtering process.

3.2.

Figure 2. Functional components of the SGTWDM.

TDG, the source and destination internet protocol (IP)
addresses are defined as nodes, and the network flow (or
communication) between the source and destination is
defined as a link. The TCP tuple is used to identify the
source and destination nodes of a network flow [22].
Network logical flows are used to create the
adjacency matrix A, degree matrix D, and Laplacian
matrix Q. The n × n adjacency matrix is defined as
(
wi,j
A(i, j) =
0

if ai,j ∈ L,
otherwise.

(1)

where wi,j is the link weight between the ith and j th
nodes, ai,j is the ith element of the j th column of A, and
L is the set of all links. In the case of the SGTWDM,
wi,j = 1 if a logical flow exists between a pair of nodes,
and wi,j = 0 if a logical flow does not exist between a
pair of nodes. The n × n degree matrix is defined as
(P
n
D(i, j) =

j=1

0

wi,j

if i = j,
otherwise.

The n × n Laplacian matrix is defined as

(2)

Phantom Component

Expanding upon techniques utilized in [23], we
developed the phantom component. The phantom
component is a mathematical construct of a cluster of
connected nodes that does not physically exist in the
traffic flows of the TDG, but exists within A. The
phantom component is designed to provide a graphical
representation of a known attack behavior.
To develop the phantom component for worm
attacks, we draw upon the causal tree behavior presented
in [20]. Figure 3 shows the graphical behavior of a
worm attack using the behavior of an infected node
during the target search and discovery process. During
this process, the infected node attempts to discover a
new target by sending a SYN packet as part of the
TCP three-way handshake. The proposed phantom
component for a worm attack only utilizes the first level
of offspring from the graphical behavior of the worm in
Figure 3. Additionally, the flow direction of the links in
the graphical behavior is disregarded since the phantom
component resides in the undirected, symmetric A. In
order to achieve additional levels of offspring from the
phantom component, memory must be introduced to
store detected worm attack behavior (see Section 3.5).
It is important to note, we considered a phantom
component with more levels of offspring and no system
memory, but found through initial analysis that this
generally increased the false alarm rates. Additional
research needs to be conducted to determine the cause
of the increase.
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in (8) will be larger for the smallest degree nodes in
the eigenvector associated to λ2 compared to the largest
degree node. Conversely, the magnitude of the scaling
1
will be larger for the largest degree nodes in
factor di −λ
j

Figure 3. Graphical representation of the behavior of
a worm attack.

3.3.

the eigenvector associated to λ6 compared to the smaller
degree node. As depicted in Figure 4, this results in the
smallest degree node having a larger magnitude in vi,2
and the largest degree node having a larger magnitude
in vi,6 . We expand this line of reasoning in Figure
5 to show how node connectivity directly impacts the
magnitude of the value in each n × 1 vectors of V .

Strong Node Concept

The SNC uses spectral graph theory tools to
associate a node’s connectivity to the element values
within V . While this concept is utilized in [23],
the SNC has never been formally defined, and the
mathematical foundation for the SNC has not previously
been provided.
Spectral graph theory uses Q to solve for the
eigenvalues and eigenvectors, which provide spectral
analysis of the graph characteristics. The eigenvalues
and eigenvectors are defined as the solution to
Qvi = λi vi ,

i = 1, 2, ..., n

(5)

th

where λi is the i eigenvalue, vi is the corresponding
n × 1 eigenvector, i is the index of the eigenspectrum,
and the order of the eigenvalues is [27]
0 = λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ ... ≤ λn−1 ≤ λn .

(6)

Utilizing these spectral graph theory tools, we have
developed a mathematical foundation for the SNC.
Given (3), (5) can be rewritten as

0 = di vi,j − (

n
X

ai,k vk,j | k 6= i) − λj vi,j

(7)

k=1

or
vi,j

1
=
(
di − λ j

n
X

Figure 4. Visual number line depiction of effects of
1
scaling factor di −λ
from (8) on the magnitude values
j
in vij .

Using deductive reasoning
Pn to expand upon these
results, the summation ( k=1 aik vkj | k 6= i), from
(8), is directly influenced by the degree of the node
and the connectivity of its neighbors. In other words,
a node with a higher degree will have more terms in
the summation than a smaller degree node. However,
the terms are directly scaled by the neighboring node’s
value in the eigenvector being considered, which in turn
1
. As a result, the scaling factor
is being scaled by di −λ
j
1
di −λj

ai,k vk,j | k 6= i)

(8)

k=1

where di is the degree associated with the ith node, and
vij is the ith element in the j th vector of V [28].
Holding all other variables constant, di and λj
provide insight into the behavior of vi,j . Given a
network containing six nodes where d1 ≤ d2 ≤ d3 ≤
1
d4 ≤ d5 ≤ d6 , the magnitude of the scaling factor di −λ
j

in (8) appears to be the dominating factor of the

equation. Consequently, the effects depicted in Figure 5
should hold true across all networks and graphs.

3.4.

SNC-based Detection

The SGTWDM combines the phantom component
with the SNC to detect worm attacks. In general, a
phantom component threshold Tphantom (see Section
3.6) is utilized to establish a threshold Teigenindex
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3.6.

1
Figure 5. Effects of scaling factor di −λ
from (8) on
j
the magnitude of the values in vij given
d1 ≤ d2 ≤ d3 ≤ d4 ≤ d5 ≤ d6 .

within the eigenspectrum of Λ and V . Specifically,
the phantom component will have the primary nodal
primary
influence |vi,j
|, defined as the largest |vi,j | in
eigenspectrum index j, in one or more of the n ×
1 column-vectors of V . The eigenvalue λphantom
associated with the largest eigenspectrum index where
primary
the phantom component has |vi,j
| is then utilized
to establish Teigenindex . Specifically, Teigenindex is
equal to the smallest eigenspectrum index that has an
eigenvalue equal to λphantom . As a result, nodes that
primary
have |vi,j
| in an eigenspectrum index greater than
or equal to Teigenindex are detected as infected and
exhibiting worm attack behavior. Additionally, all other
non-zero |vi,j | in that eigenspectrum index are identified
as potential victims of the worm attack.

3.5.

Memory

Since only a single level of offspring is utilized in
the phantom component, memory must be introduced
into the detection method to detect a second level of
offspring. This in turn reduces the number of the false
alarms by distinguishing worm attack behavior from
normal network traffic.
The offspring, or potential victims, of an identified
infected node are stored in memory for a specified
length of time tlog (see Section 3.6). If one of the
stored offspring nodes is detected as an infected node
in a subsequent detection window, then the SGTWDM
detects a worm attack and outputs the attack parameters
(see Section 3.7). As a result, the SGTWDM is designed
to detect worm attacks once the second node is infected.
This means the first node infected by the worm will not
be identified as infected until a second node is infected
and begins scanning for new victims.

External Parameters

There are three parameters critical to the SGTWDM
that must be externally determined by the network
administrator. The first two parameters are the window
length Lw and Tphantom . Lw controls the amount
of traffic flows that are processed through the system
and should be as small as possible to reduce the
computational costs and provide quick identification
of worm attacks. Tphantom represents the number of
offspring in the phantom component and should be as
large as possible to keep benign network traffic below
the SNC detection threshold. The ratio give by
T
< Rscan
Lw

(9)

must also hold true, where Rscan is the worm scan rate.
The third parameter is length of time tlog the
first-level offspring (and its parent) are logged and
stored in memory. In general, the relationship given by
tlog > tT − tSY N

(10)

must be valid, where tT is the time when the newly
infected victim sends Tphantom or more SYN packets
in the defined Lw , and tSY N is the time when the newly
infected node first received the SYN-only packet of the
TCP three-way handshake from its infector.

3.7.

Attack Parameter Outputs

The SGTWDM not only detects a worm attack
among normal network traffic, it also intrinsically
provides the exact nodes that are infected (the parent
nodes from the graphical flows that produced a worm
alarm), potential additional victims (the offspring nodes
from the graphical flows that produced a worm alarm),
and an estimated scan rate of the worm given by
Rscanest =

O2
,
Lw

(11)

where O2 is the number of second-level offspring of
the graphical flows that produced a worm alarm. These
three attack parameters provide network defenders with
critical information to defend against the worm attack. It
even provides the opportunity to externally pre-program
network responses to attain quicker response times.

4.

Results

In this section, we provide the results from three
sets of simulations using MATLAB. The first and
second simulations examine the SGTWDM detection
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Lw
1
2
3
4

Table 3. Performance metrics of the SGTWDM against the Blaster worm.
Detection time (from
Scans sent by 2nd
Size of infection at
Detection rate
2nd node infection)
node prior to detection
time of detection
1.00
0.42 seconds
20
2
1.00
0.92 seconds
20
2
1.00
0.92 seconds
20
2
1.00
0.92 seconds
20
2

Table 4. Performance metrics of the SGTWDM against the WannaCry worm.
Detection time (from
Scans sent by 2nd
Size of infection at
nd
Lw Detection rate
2 node infection)
node prior to detection
time of detection
1
1.00
6.16 seconds
15
2
2
1.00
4.16 seconds
9
2
3
1.00
2.16 seconds
5
2
4
1.00
2.16 seconds
5
2

rate and detection time for datasets containing a Blaster
worm and a WannaCry worm, respectively. For these
simulations, we focus on the windows around the time
that the second node is infected since the SGTWDM
cannot detect an attack until the second node is infected
and begins exhibiting worm attack behavior. We select
different Lw that align with (9) and are small enough
to provide quick identification of a potentially fast
spreading attack. The third simulation examines a larger
network traffic dataset containing no worm attack to
determine the system’s ability to distinguish normal
network traffic from attack traffic. For all simulations,
we set tlog = 40 seconds to account for worms that
require a system reboot as part of the infection process
[29, 30], and Tphantom = 5 to align with (9) and
evaluated characteristics of numerous historical worm
attacks.

and the time to detect the second infected node after it
began exhibiting worm attack behavior was less than one
second. These results improve upon the detection rates
from our literature review (presented in Table 2). It is
important to note, our detection time is from the second
node infected, whereas the detection times in Table 2 are
from the initial infection. As a result, we are unable to
fairly compare our detection times to those in Table 2.
Since the worm attack was detected when the
infection size was only two nodes, a response
mechanism could be implemented by the network
administrator to potentially stop the worm attack before
it reached it’s final size of 11 nodes. It is important
to note, the SGTWDM also accurately and quickly
detected each of the nine subsequently infected nodes
once they began exhibity worm attack behavior.

4.2.
4.1.

WannaCry Worm Dataset

Blaster Worm Model

For the first simulation, we developed a model of
the Blaster worm utilizing specifications from [29, 30].
We used MATLAB to produce Blaster worm traffic, and
then spliced the worm attack traffic into 60 minutes of
normal network traffic flows collected from the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) network in 2013. For
the remainder of this paper, this collection of NPS
campus flows is referred to as the NPS2013 dataset.
The NPS2013 dataset contains 1,314 nodes and has
an estimated average SYN transmission rate of 16.17
packets per second. The final infection size of the
Blaster worm is 11 nodes at the end of 60 minutes.
For our results, we focus on minute 38 to minute
39 of the data where the second node is infected by
the Blaster worm. The performance metrics of the
SGTWDM against the Blaster worm are shown in Table
3. For all evaluated Lw , the detection rate was one

For the second simulation, we utilized the WannaCry
datasets: CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-284-1 [31] and
CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-285-1 [32]. Combining
the two datasets, we focused on the data between 450
and 515 seconds where the second node is infected by
the Wannacry worm. The final infection size of this
dataset is 2 nodes. The performance metrics of the
SGTWDM against the WannaCry worm are shown in
Table 4. For all evaluated Lw , the detection rate was
one but the times to detect the infection ranged from just
over two second to just over six seconds. The detection
results improve upon the detection rates in from our
literature review, presented in Table 2, but at the expense
of a longer detection time. Again, it is important to note,
our detection time is from the second node infected,
whereas the detection times in Table 2 are from the
initial infection. As a result, we are unable to fairly
compare our detection times to those in Table 2.
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Compared to the Blaster worm simulation, the time
to detect the infection was greater due to the initially
slow scan rate of the second node after it’s infection.
This indicates that the SGTWDM performs better with
a smaller Lw against worms that have a faster ramp
up in scan behavior compared to worms that have a
slower ramp up in scan behavior. Worms that have a
slower ramp up in scan behavior require a longer Lw to
decrease the detection time.

4.3.

System False Alarm Rate

For the final simulation, we ran the NPS2013 dataset
through our SGTWDM to determine the system false
alarm rates. We evaluated the false alarm rates for Lw =
{0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} seconds. These specific Lw were
selected based on two criteria: 1) alignment with the Lw
utilized in the first two simulations, and 2) requirement
to provide quick identification of a potentially fast
spreading attack. The false alarm rate results of this
simulation are shown in Figure 6. As expected, the
false alarm rate increases as Lw increases; a longer
Lw provides more opportunity for normal traffic to
send a number of SYN packets greater than or equal
to Tphantom . As a result, a smaller Lw needs to be
implemented by the network administrator to keep false
alarm rates low. Still, even at Lw = 5, the false alarm
rate is only 0.001 greater than the theoretical rate in
[20, 21] and vastly improves upon [17] (see Table 2).
0.018
0.016

False Alarm Rate

0.014
0.012
0.01
0.008
0.006
0.004
0.002
0
0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

5.5

Window Length (sec)

Figure 6. False alarm rates of the SGTWDM using
normal traffic flows from the NPS2013 dataset.

5.

Conclusions and Future Work

This paper proposed a novel SGTWDM that
utilizes spectral graph theory tools to quickly and
accurately detect worm attacks. We discussed the

underlying components of the model, including TDGs,
phantom components, and the SNC. We provided
a mathematical foundation to support the SNC, and
described the SNC-based detection method employed
in the SGTWDM. We then simulated the model in
MATLAB and evaluated the model using the NPS2013
dataset, a modeled Blaster worm, and a WannaCry
worm dataset to determine the detection rates, false
alarm rates, and times to detection. Using the Blaster
worm and WannaCry datasets, the SGTWDM produced
a detection rate of one once the second infected node
began exhibiting worm attack behavior. From the
NPS2013 dataset, we determined that the false alarm
rate of the SGTWDM increases as Lw increases.
Regardless, the results improve upon the other detection
methods examined in our literature review.
Our future work will focus on developing a system
that utilizes the SGTWDM to detect and classify both
worm and distributed denial of service attacks. The
system will be theoretically analyzed to develop upper
and lower bounds on the system’s false alarm rates.
Additionally, research needs to be conducted on the
effects of perturbation on the network traffic to the
spectral graph-based detection method.

References
[1] SecurityMagazine. (2019, Oct.) First three quarters of
2019: 7.2 billion malware attacks, 151.9 million
ransomware attacks. Security Magazine. [Online].
Available: https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/
91133
[2] J. Davis. (2019,
Jul.) Phishing attacks on
the rise,
25% increase in threats evading
security. Health IT Security. [Online]. Available:
https://healthitsecurity.com/news/phishing-attacks-onthe-rise-25-increase-in-threats-evading-security
[3] M. Boddy. (2019, Aug.) Report: Cryptojacking
campaigns up by 29%, ransomware attacks up
118%. COINTELEGRAPH. [Online]. Available:
https://cointelegraph.com/news/report-cryptojackingcampaigns-up-by-29-ransomware-attacks-up-118
[4] MalwarebytesLabs. (2020, Feb.) 2020 state of
malware report. MalwareBytes Labs. [Online].
Available:
https://resources.malwarebytes.com/files/
2020/02/2020 State-of-Malware-Report.pdf
[5] F. Wang, Y. Zhang, C. Wang, J. Ma, and S. Moon,
“Stability analysis of a SEIQV epidemic model for rapid
spreading worms,” Computers Security, vol. 29, pp.
410–418, 2010.
[6] J. L. Safar, M. Tummala, J. C. McEachen, and
C. Bollmann, “Modeling worm propagation and insider
threat in air-gapped network using modified seiqv
model,” in 2019 13th International Conference on Signal
Processing and Communication Systems (ICSPCS),
2019, pp. 1–6.
[7] NakedSecurity. (2018,
Sep.) Wannacry
the
worm that just wont die. SOPHOS. [Online].
Available: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2019/09/
18/wannacry-the-worm-that-just-wont-die/

Page 7053

[8] L. Ertoz, E. Eilertson, A. Lazarevic, P.-n. Tan, V. Kumar,
and J. Srivastava, “Minds minnesota intrusion detection
system,” in NextGeneration Data Mining, H. Kargupta,
J. Han, P. S. Yu, R. Motwani, and V. Kumar, Eds.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004, ch. 3, pp. 199–218.

[23] J. Johnson, “Software defined network monitoring
scheme using spectral graph theory and phantom
nodes,” M.S. thesis, Dept. of Electrical and Computer
Engineering, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA,
2014.

[9] G. Gu, M. Sharif, X. Qin, D. Dagon, W. Lee, and
G. Riley, “Worm detection, early warning and response
based on local victim information,” in 20th Annual
Computer Security Applications Conference, 2004, pp.
136–145.

[24] G. B. V. Berk and R. Morris, “Designing and framework
for active worm detection on global networks,” in
Proceedings of 1st IEEE International Workshop on
Information Assurance, 2003.

[10] I. Butun, S. D. Morgera, and R. Sankar, “A survey of
intrusion detection systems in wireless sensor networks,”
IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, vol. 16,
no. 1, pp. 266–282, 2014.
[11] O. Kachirski and R. Guha, “Effective intrusion detection
using multiple sensors in wireless ad hoc netowrks,”
in Proceedings of 36th Annual Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), 2003, p. 57.
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